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The New Forest Management Regime in Kenya: Effects on 
Household Farm Forestry in Kakamega 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This study investigates the factors that influence participation of households in devolved 
system of forest management by joining community forest associations (CFA). It further 
employs Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to measure the impact of household’s 
participation in CFA on farm forestry decisions. The analysis uses cross-sectional data 
from a survey of Kakamega forest communities in Kenya in 2010. Generally, our findings 
reveal that participation in CFA by households is influenced broadly by socio-economic 
and institutional factors, and that participation in CFA has a positive impact on farm 
forestry development. Policy makers and development practitioners, therefore, need to 
devise, implement and sufficient fund interventions that would promote development of 
community forest associations with the ultimate goal of increasing forest cover in the 
country. 
 
Keywords: Participatory Forest Management, Selection Bias, Farm Forestry 
Development, Kenya 
JEL Classification: Q12, Q28, D52 
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 Forest Management Decentralization in Kenya: Effects on 
Household Farm Forestry in Kakamega 
 
1. Introduction 
Decentralized forest management regime has gained currency in developing countries in 
the recent years (Agrawal, Chhatre and Hardin 2008), being viewed as a means of 
enhancing economic efficiency, public accountability, community and individual 
empowerment, and allocative efficiency in the forest sub-sector (World Bank, 2009). 
These reforms are expected to reconcile conservation and livelihood needs. In particular, 
forest decentralization is aimed at enhancing peoples’ livelihoods, poverty alleviation and 
preservation of the forest condition.  
 
Decentralization policies, however, do not affect forest users’ behaviour directly. Rather 
they change local incentive structures by altering security, access and the power structure 
of local governance which in turn lead to behavioural change. The expected outcomes of 
regime change are mediated by forestry regulations that impose conditions for use of 
forest resources, and by the capacities of small holders and communities to adapt to those 
regulations. For instance, communities are required to implement workable systems of 
governance for their collective lands, exclude third parties and engage in competitive 
conditions with the forest markets. Indirectly, the outcomes of the reform are also 
influenced by access to financial and non-financial services. In the absence of these 
conditions, forest tenure reforms are unlikely to achieve their livelihood and conservation 
goals. Thus, decentralization policies may produce a variety of outcomes, both desirable 
and undesirable. For example, many of the Community Forest Associations (CFAs) 
formed in Kenya were driven by expectations beyond what the legislation provided for 
(Ongugo, 2007; Ongugo et al., 2007). Indeed some CFAs anticipated converting forests 
into farmlands for production of cash and food crops (Ongugo et al., 2004). Basically, the 
diverse outcomes are dependent on community experiences and traditions, and the 
capacity of the local communities to take advantage of the prevailing market conditions 
(Monterroso, 2008). 
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Numerous benefits are expected to accrue to individuals from participating in community 
forest associations through increased access to forest products such as fuel wood, herbal 
medicine, honey, tree seedlings, thatch grass and fodder. Other activities allowed within 
the co-management framework include eco-tourism, bee-keeping, fish farming and 
growing of crops. With these benefits, it would be expected that communities would fast 
embrace the system and participate effectively. However, the progress has been slow and, 
in some cases, CFAs have been formed only to collapse after a short while (Ongugo et 
al., 2007). But it is also important to note that, decentralization of forest management 
may not necessarily yield desirable environmental outcomes as has been revealed by 
evaluation studies elsewhere in the World (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Thus, it is critical 
and urgent to understand what drives individual households to participate in community 
forest associations and how this participation impacts on specified environmental 
outcomes in Kenya.  
 
Several studies have been conducted on community participation in forest management, 
effects of PFM on household poverty and opportunity cost of forest conservation 
(Emerton, 1999; Mogaka et al., 2001; Colfer, 2005; Mbuvi et al., 2007; Ongugo, 2007; 
Guthiga et al., 2008; and Borner et al., 2009). Decentralization policies interact with 
numerous context-specific pressures and interactions to change governance institutions, 
forest user behaviour and resulting forest conditions and livelihood outcomes (Andersson 
et al., 2008). While there are several theoretical arguments relating benefits and costs of 
forest decentralization, these fail to generate consistent predictions (Andersson, et al., 
2008). These studies ignore behavioural changes resulting from decentralization among 
forest users in their empirical investigations. 
 
This study seeks to address this gap by first examining the drivers of household’s 
participation in community forest associations (CFA) which is the framework through 
which communities take part in forest management before analyzing how this 
participation impacts on household farm forestry investment decisions. We seek to 
understand how decentralization policies filter down to local forest users. Economic 
theory does not provide clear predictions about the effects of decentralization policies on 
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forest users’ behaviour. Instead we must derive from studies of how such policies interact 
with existing biophysical, socio-demographic variable such as age, gender and 
educational variables, wealth and other factors change incentives at the local level. We 
test the effects of forest decentralization, arguing that the effects of decentralization need 
to be understood according to specific contexts. We investigate the effects of 
decentralization drawing on data collected from Kakamega forest in Western Kenya in 
2010. In particular, we test the effects of decentralization on the farmers’ participation in 
community forest associations and how this affects on-farm forestry investment 
decisions. Increased forestry cover is a key policy requirement in Kenya, where forest 
cover is only 3 percent, much lower than the globally recommended rate of 10 percent. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we review the history of 
decentralized forest reforms in Kenya.  In section 3 we draw on existing literature to 
derive factors that influence household farm forest investment decisions. Section 4 
examines methodological issues while Section 5 outlines the study area and provides 
summary statistics of the variables used. In section 6, we report our empirical results and 
discuss these findings and in section 7 we conclude and draw policy recommendations.  
 
2. Forest Decentralization trends in Kenya 
The colonial government of Kenya created a forest department in 1902, which alienate 
most prior existing community-managed forests. The Forest Department managed and 
controlled all forests in the country with policy focused on conservation. Following 
independence in 1963, a series of donor funded forestry programs focused on 
afforestation and reforestation on farms, with the goal of alleviating fuel wood shortages. 
The Forest department managed the forests without consultation outside the relevant 
government ministry. Conflicts increased in the late 1980s between communities who 
needed fuel wood from neighbouring forests, and the forest department (Ongugo and 
Njuguna 2004). 
 
The Forest Act of 2005 saw the formation of the Kenya Forest Service (KFS), a semi 
autonomous government agency with representation from various government ministries. 
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Under the Act, the KFS is expected to devolve powers to the private sector and to forest 
conservation committees and community forest associations (CFAs). Community 
participation is achieved primarily through CFAs, and integrated management of forests 
is the central principle motivating the new policy (Ongugo, et al., 2007). 
 
A number of CFAs have been formed through sensitization of communities adjacent to 
the major forests in the country by the Kenya Forest Action Network (FAN) and the 
Kenya Forests Working Group (KFWG) (Ongugo et al., 2007). Lately, the Kenya Forest 
Service has also been spearheading the formation of CFAs as a step towards meeting the 
requirements of the Forest Act (2005). The CFAs rely only on membership fee and 
subscription by members as their main sources of funds (Kinyanjui, 2007). 
 
3. A review of farm forestry decisions by rural households 
 
This section reviews the link between participation in community forest management 
groups and households’ farm forestry investment decisions. It also explores other factors 
that may motivate households to undertake on-farm tree growing. 
 
It is generally recognized in the literature that a number of factors explain the differences 
in farm tree growing decisions by smallholder farmers. However, the specific socio-
economic and institutional variables affecting the decisions differ across countries, 
regions, villages, and farms. Moreover, the direction of influence of a given variable is 
not often consistent across studies.  
 
Participation in forest management groups has been shown to influence decisions to plant 
more trees on-farm (Emtage and Suh, 2004). Perhaps this is due to the fact that it 
enhances people’s attached value to forest ecosystems and the need to protect them; 
which in turn results in their desire to increase forest cover on their farms. Moreover, 
participation in community-based conservation groups enhances farmers’ access to 
diversity, quality and quantity of tree species (Boffa et al, 2005).  
 
7 
 
Besides Participation in community forest management, households’ decisions to plant 
trees may be directly influenced by household-specific, plot-specific and institutional 
factors. For instance, farm forests have enormous environmental advantages beyond 
direct benefits to the farm households. To comprehend these indirect benefits, the 
decision-maker at household level requires some education, either formal or informal, 
obtained through schooling or extension services. Thus, better educated household heads 
or households with access to government or farmer-farmer extension services are better 
adopters of farm forestry (Muneer, 2008), either because they view tree planting as a 
means of improving the land (Dewees, 1995) or because they are able to appreciate other 
non-quantifiable benefits as ambiance, micro-climate modification or carbon 
sequestration. This also explains why households with good social networks may have a 
higher possibility of planting trees because they are able to get extension services through 
such networks (Gebreegziabher et al., 2010; Muneer, 2008). 
 
Institutional factors have also been shown to influence the decision by households to 
plant trees. Secure land tenure arrangements, for example, have been found to influence 
tree planting decisions among farmer groups. Trees take a longer gestation period and 
only farmers who are confident of continued use of a given plot would be encouraged to 
plant them (Bannister and Nair, 2003; Deininger and Feder, 2001; Gebreegziabher et al., 
2010; Warner, 1995). However, some studies do not agree with the idea that secure 
tenure may encourage tree planting and cite cases where communal ownership of land 
has been more conducive for development of farm forestry (German et al., 2009). 
Perhaps tree planting in areas with ambiguous land tenure system is a means used by 
households to place a claim of legitimacy of ownership and/or access. 
 
4. Methodology  
This paper has twin objectives, to identify the determinants of a household’s participation 
in CFA, and to estimate the impact of participation in CFA on farm forestry investment 
decisions. We discuss the approaches used to achieve these objectives in this section. 
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4.1 Analyzing the determinants of participation in CFA 
Participation in CFA has potential costs and benefits which are perceived uniquely by 
different households. Costs may include membership fees, monthly/annual subscriptions, 
and time to undertake the association’s activities while benefits may include access to 
forest products, contracts to undertake specified activities within the forest, grazing in the 
forest, access to information on care for trees and general benefits of maintaining forests, 
and better access to quality tree seedlings. The individual decision to participate in CFA 
can be modeled in a random utility framework, popular in analyzing innovation adoption 
under uncertainty (see Feder, Just and Zilberman, 1985). This implies that participation in 
CFA can be modeled as a binary choice based on utility maximization subject to 
household resource constraint (Manski, 1977). The utility function of the household can 
be expressed as: 
 iii XfU   )(                                                                                                   (1) 
where iX is a vector of exogenous variables and   is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated. The unobserved part of the household’s utility is represented by i  which is 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed with mean of zero. A farm 
household will choose to participate in if the utility derived from participation, piU is 
higher than the utility derived from non-participation, niU . The probability of a household 
being a member of CFA is given by )( ii XP   . Thus, the participation model to be 
estimated is: 
 ,)()1( iiiii XXPpP                                                                       (2) 
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The behavior of each household is influenced by its transaction costs as influenced by its 
access to information, assets, services and markets (Barret, 2008). Whether a household 
participates in CFA or not is dependent on its evaluation of the costs and benefits. 
 
Literature indicates that human capital is important for receiving and processing 
information with regards to new developments (Schultz, 1982). Education and 
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experience, captured by the level of education and age of the household’s decision-maker 
are, thus, important to be included in the analysis. Other important factors are the 
physical assets such as land, labour and cash (Boahene, Snijders, and Folmer, 1999). We, 
thus, include the landholding size, household size (to proxy for access to labour) and 
access to credit to proxy for cash. Whether a household owns cows or oxen is also 
important in the analysis as they indicate the household wealth level. Moreover, 
ownership of such livestock may drive the need to participate in CFA to access fodder. 
Oxen ownership may also proxy for transport cost. Because households participate in 
CFAs because of perceived benefits (Ongugo et al., 2007), distance to the forest and the 
forest management agency are likely to influence participation. Households that are close 
to the forest are more likely to participate because they stand to gain more as they incur 
lower costs to access the forest. A management agency like the Kenya Wildlife Service 
(KWS) completely restricts entry into the forests and is likely to discourage participation. 
 
Gender of the household head may influence participation. Men and women have 
different opportunities, motivation and capabilities to involve themselves in collective 
action (Pandolfelli, Meinzen-Dick, and Dohrn, 2007). Domestic responsibilities may also 
reduce chances of women to participate in groups (Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 1998). 
Because of this, we include the gender of the household head in the analysis. 
 
The influence of social networks in decision-making among the smallholder households 
has been recognized in literature. Such networks are for farmer-to-farmer extension and 
may accelerate diffusion of new ideas (Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; and Conley and 
Udry, 2010). As a result, we include the number of social groups, other than CFA, that a 
household participates in. 
 
4.2 Analyzing Impact of Participation in CFA on Farm Forestry 
The main interest here is to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). 
That is, how participation in community forest association affects on-farm growing of 
trees. Because we are not able to observe what the results would have been without 
participation, we have to deal with missing data on the counterfactual. The remedy is to 
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identify non-participating households and use them as counterfactual. But we must also 
deal with selection bias because self-selection into CFA membership is non-random. 
Self-selection implies that mere comparison of outcomes of CFA members and non-
members cannot yield reliable results. 
 
Selection bias may arise from systematic differences between participants and non-
participant. These arise from observable characteristics such as asset ownership and 
education. We use propensity score matching (PSM) to control for the observable 
characteristics. PSM constructs a suitable comparison with non-participants that are 
similar to the participants in all relevant observable attributes (Caliando and Kopeinig, 
2008). Another potential source of bias is differences between participants and non-
participants in terms of the unobservables. PSM cannot control for this kind of bias, and 
therefore we test for robustness of our impact results using different specifications. 
 
Execution of PSM is undertaken in two stages. The first stage involves generation of the 
propensity scores, ),(XP  from the probit model. These scores indicate the probabilities 
of respective households being members of CFAs. From the scores, we construct a 
control group by matching participants to non-participants according to their propensity 
scores. Participants for whom no matches are found and the non-participants that are not 
used as matches are excluded from further analysis. In the second stage, we compute the 
ATT of membership to CFA on extent of household farm forestry using the matched 
observations. PSM estimator of the ATT is obtained by computing the difference in 
acreage under trees between households participating in CFA and the non-participating 
ones which are appropriately matched by the propensity scores, expressed as: 
     ,)(,0)0()(,1)1()1)(( XPpYEXPpYEpXPEPSMATT                       (3) 
where )1(Y and )0(Y  represent acreage under trees for participating households and non-
participating households, respectively. 1p indicates treated/participating households 
while 0p indicates control/non-participating households. We use all the variables in 
the PSM probit in the outcome analysis with the belief that the inclusion of even non-
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significant variables cannot bias the estimates nor can they make them inconsistent (see 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008 for details). 
 
5. The Study Area and Data  
The study site for this survey was around Kakamega Forest, situated in Kakamega 
District in Western Province of Kenya (Figure 1). It lies north-east of the Lake Victoria 
between latitudes of 00°10’N and 00°21’N and longitudes of 34°47’E and 34°58’E at 
about 1600 m above sea level. The forest area is drained by two main river systems, the 
Isiukhu River to the north and the Yala River to the south.   The forest is the only 
remaining rain forest in Kenya and is the furthest east remnant of the Guinea-Congolean 
rain forest. According to the 1994 welfare monitoring survey, 52% of the population in 
the district lives below the poverty line, meaning that they can hardly afford basic 
necessities like food, shelter, clothing, and education. As such there is a heavy reliance on 
the forest to supplement their daily necessities. This region has also been considered by 
the Kenya Woodfuel and Agro-forestry Programme (KWAP) as one of the areas that 
could benefit most from policies that target improvement of forestry projects due to its 
high population and high agricultural potential.  
 
Source: Biota Sub-project E13 data bank, 2006 
Figure 1: Kakamega forest and its environs 
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The data for this study was collected from communities around Kakamega forest in 
western part of Kenya. The study focused on households residing adjacent to the forest.  
A random sample of 318 households was interviewed using a detailed semi-structured 
questionnaire. The sampled households were randomly interspersed in the study area and 
across the three management regimes. The management regimes were Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS), Kenya Forest Services (KFS) and the Quakers Church (QC). Table 5.1 
captures the descriptive statistics for respondents that participated in Community Forest 
Associations (CFAs).  
Table 5.1: Basic descriptive statistics for participants and non-participants in CFAs 
 Participants in CFAs Non-participants 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
dev. 
Obs Mean Std. dev. 
Individual attributes       
Age of head 153 48 13.2 182 46.6 15.07 
Education level of the household 
head (0=no education, 1=primary, 
2=secondary, 3=tertiary) 
153 2.4 0.81 182 2.43 0.87 
Number of household members 149 6 1.8 187 5 1.90 
Gender of household head 
(1=male; 0=female) 
153 0.79 0.40 182 0.69 0.46 
       
Farm  characteristics       
Farm size in acres 150 1.9 1.77 179 2.32 2.44 
Value of total assets 153 18791 33779 195 21156.8 71025 
Time to nearest forest edge 
(minutes) 
153 22.2 59.0 195 24.6 23.6 
Proportion of households owning 
cows 
153 0.79 0.40 186 0.76 0.42 
Proportion of households owning 
oxen 
153 0.37 0.48 186 0.32 0.47 
Access to credit facilities (1 if yes, 
0 otherwise) 
150 0.27 0.44 178 0.08 0.27 
Acreage under trees on farm 153 0.41 0.45 195 0.26 0.29 
       
Institutional attributes       
Participation in social groups other 
than CFAs 
153 1.74 1.20 195 0.91 0.98 
Forest management regime 
(0=KWS, 1= KFS) 
153 0.91 0.29 195 0.8 0.40 
Awareness of new Forest Act 
before joining CFA 
150 0.85 0.35 165 0.37 0.48 
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The mean age of household head is 48 years and 47 years for participating and non-
participating households, respectively. The education level for both participants and non-
participants was generally fair, averaging at secondary school. The household size for 
participants and non-participants is 6 and 5 members respectively. Larger family sizes 
would have more demand for forest products due to high consumption. Having large 
family size could then act as an incentive to participate in CFAs.  79% of those who 
participated in CFAs were male headed households. It is presumed that male headed 
households may be better resourced and informed to participate in CFAs. Though male 
headed households also dominated among non-participants, the response rates were 
slightly lower (69%).  
 
On farm characteristics, participants in CFAs had smaller land sizes (averagely 1.9 acres) 
relative to that owned by non-participants (2.3 acres). Non-participants would need larger 
farm sizes so as to be able to plant trees and compensate for the foregone benefits of 
forest products access enjoyed by participants. Another variable of significant interest is 
access to credit facilities which is likely to influence participation decision. 27% of 
participants had access to credit compared to a paltry 8% of non-participants who 
accessed similar facilities.  
 
With regards to institutional attributes, households not participating in CFAs were, on 
average, belonging to 1 social group while participating households belonged to 2 none 
CFA social groups. Participation was also informed by the type of management regime 
one was in, whether KFS or KWS. KFS is more flexible and allows entry into the forest 
while KWS is more restrictive. Awareness about the new forest law also influenced the 
decision to join CFAs with 85% of participants having been aware relative to 37% of 
non-participants.  
 
Notably, the difference in mean acreage under tree cultivation between non-participating 
and participating households is different from zero with t-statistic of -3.64. This makes it 
important to investigate whether this difference indeed originating from CFA 
membership. 
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6. Results and Discussion 
 
In this section we show and discuss the results of our analysis of the determinants of 
participation in CFA by households adjacent to Kakamega forest, and how this 
participation impacts on household farm forestry behavior. 
 
 6.1 Determinants of household participation in CFA 
 
We estimate the probit model of household membership to CFAs as described in Eq. 2. 
The results are displayed in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Probit Model of CFA Membership 
Variable  Marginal Effect Standard Error Z  
Distance to forest (in minutes) -0.006 0.004 -1.70* 
Access to credit 0.253 0.097 2.43** 
Owning cow(s) 0.049 0.091 0.53 
Owning oxen -0.002 0.079 -0.03 
Household size 0.034 0.020 1.72* 
Landholding size -0.048 0.021 -2.31** 
Male household head 0.039 0.088 0.44 
Education level of head 0.017 0.051 0.34 
No. of social groups  0.107 0.037 2.85*** 
Distance to forest Squared 0.00002 0.00004 0.70 
Age of head 0.004 0.003 1.47 
Log of household assets value -0.009 0.034 -0.28 
Aware of forest act before joining cfa 0.487 0.062 6.77*** 
Management agency is KFS 0.217 0.096 2.10** 
No. of observations 297   
Pseudo R-Squared 0.33   
Note: * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
 
Distance to the forest has a negative effect on the probability of a household participating 
in CFA; each additional minute of walking time to the forest reduces the probability by 
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0.6 percentage points. This is reasonable because if households join CFA to benefit from 
extraction of forest products, households that are far from forests will have less impetus 
to participate because it would be more expensive for them to travel to the forests for 
such products. 
 
Access to credit has a positive effect. It increases a household’s chance of participating in 
CFA by about 25.3 percentage points. That is, households with access to credit have 25.3 
percent higher probability of joining CFA than their counterparts without. This is 
plausible because such households are better endowed in terms of cash that would enable 
them to meet membership fees and the periodic subscriptions by CFA members. Such 
households may also be better endowed to hire labour or purchase equipments that would 
maximize their gains from participating in CFA. As a result, they would be more 
motivated to participate in CFAs. 
 
Larger households have a 3.5 percent higher chance of participating in CFAs. The reason 
for this is fairly straight forward. The size of household proxies for household labour 
endowment. Thus, larger households have labour time to devote to the activities of CFAs. 
Moreover, such households would be better placed in terms of labour for extraction of 
forest products. Larger households may also be viewed as having greater demand for 
forest products which they may not satisfy front on-farm production. Thus, participating 
in CFAs and benefiting from forest products could be viewed as a viable livelihood 
alternative for the larger households. 
 
Household landholding size has a negative effect on CFA membership. Each additional 
acre of land owned reduces the probability of participating in CFAs by 4.8 percentage 
points. Possible explanation to this is that households with larger pieces of land may 
produce a number of products which they would otherwise extract from forests on-farm. 
If this is the situation, such households would not be motivated to join CFAs. 
 
In terms of social networks, participation in other social groups increases the possibility 
of a household joining CFA. This is understandable because through such groups 
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information on CFA is disseminated. Of course the herding behaviour may also lead 
members of a given social group to jointly decide to participate in a CFA. Furthermore, 
trust built from the previous social groups may encourage household to quickly accept 
new frontiers of collective action. 
 
Those households that were aware of the Forest Act (2005) had 48.7 percent higher 
chance of participating in CFA. This could have been because such households were 
aware of the benefits that could be derived from participating in CFAs and wanted to take 
advantage. They may also have found it easier to believe the earlier efforts to encourage 
communities to join CFAs. But management agency is also important in determining 
participation of households in CFAs. Those households that are closer to forests managed 
by the Kenya Forest Service (KFS) have 21.7 percent higher probability of participating 
in CFAs than households closer to forests managed by the Kenya Wildlife Service 
(KWS). Partly this is because KWS has been at the forefront of educating and 
encouraging communities to join CFAs. However, it must also be noted that management 
by KWS is more restrictive, limiting forest entry by communities. People would be less 
willing to participate in CFAs if that does not give them any advantages in terms of 
extraction of forest products. Thus, gains from CFA membership would be lower in 
forests run by KWS, and households being rational would be less willing to participate in 
CFAs. 
 
6.2 Impact of CFA Membership on Farm Forestry 
As indicated earlier, the matching process is preceded by specification of the propensity 
scores for the treatment variable. Probit model was employed to predict the probability of 
a household being a member of CFA as outlined and discussed in sub-section 6.1. The 
effect of participation in CFA on a household’s land area under trees (farm forestry) was 
estimated with Nearest Neighbour Matching (NNM) and Kernel-Based Matching (KBM). 
Common support condition was imposed in the estimation by matching in the region of 
common support. Figure 6.1 presents the distribution of propensity scores and the region 
of common support. The figure indicates the bias in the distribution of propensity scores 
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between members and non-members of CFA. It reveals the significance of proper 
matching and imposition of the common support condition to avoid bad matches. 
 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated: Off support Untreated: On support
Treated: On support Treated: Off support
 
Figure 6.1: Propensity Score Distribution and Common Support for Propensity Score Estimation 
 
Treated on-support shows CFA-member household which found suitable matches while 
treated off-support shows CFA-members household which did not find suitable matches. 
Similarly, untreated on-support represents non-CFA member households which found 
suitable matches whereas untreated off-support shows the non-CFA member households 
which did not find suitable matches. We present the average treatment effects and 
sensitivity analysis in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2: Average Treatment Effects and Sensitivity Analysis 
Matching 
Algorithm 
Outcome  ATT Critical level 
of hidden bias 
(Γ) 
Number of 
Treated 
Number of 
Control 
NNM Acreage 
under trees 
0.428*** 
(4.43) 
2.65-2.70 140 157 
KBM Acreage 
under trees 
0.428*** 
(4.13) 
2.00-2.05 140 157 
Note: t-values in parentheses; *** Significant at 1%. ATT= Average Treatment Effect for the treated 
 
The results indicate that membership to CFA exerts a positive and significant effect on 
household land put under tree cultivation. Precisely, the NNM and the KBM causal 
effects of CFA membership on household acreage under trees suggest that household that 
participate in CFA have 0.428 acres of land under tree cultivation more than the non-
CFA members. 
 
Results of sensitivity analysis for the presence of hidden bias are presented in the fourth 
column. Because sensitivity analysis for insignificant effects is not meaningful, we 
computed Rosenbaum bounds only for the treatment effects that were significantly 
different from zero (Hujer et al., 2004). The results indicate that, using NNM, impact of 
CFA membership on household land size under trees should be viewed critically at a 
level of Γ=2.70. The same caution on causal inference should be taken when Γ=2.05 
while using KBM. Thus, the lowest critical value is given by Γ=2.00-2.05 and the highest 
by Γ=2.65-2.70. This shows that even fairly large amounts of unobserved heterogeneity 
would not alter the inference about the estimated effects of CFA membership on tree 
planting behavior of households. 
 
The main objective of PSM estimation is to balance the distribution of relevant variables 
in the groups of CFA and non-CFA members rather than precise prediction of selection 
into treatment. We use the reduction in the median absolute standardized bias between 
the matched and unmatched models to examine the balancing power of our estimations. 
We show these results in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3: Indicators of Covariate balancing before and after matching 
Matching 
Algorithm 
Median 
absolute 
bias 
before 
matching 
Median 
absolute 
bias after 
matching 
% bias 
reduction 
(total) 
Pseudo R
2
 
(unmatched) 
Pseudo 
R
2
 
(matched) 
P-value of 
LR 
(unmatched) 
P-value 
of LR 
(matched) 
NNM 21.5 7.9 63.3 0.325 0.054 0.000 0.164 
KBM 21.5 2.9 86.5 0.325 0.017 0.000 0.963 
 
As indicated by the third and fourth columns, substantial reduction in bias was achieved 
through matching. P-values show that joint significance of the regressors was rejected 
after matching and never rejected at any level of significance before matching. This 
suggests that there was no systematic difference in the distribution of the covariates 
between members and non-members of CFA after matching. 
 
7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
 
The direct effect of households participating in community forest associations (CFA) is 
that more household land gets devoted to farm forestry. The study employed Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) to examine the direct effect of CFA membership on acreage 
under tree cultivation using cross-sectional data from a survey of farm households 
adjacent to Kakamega forest. The analysis considered the causal relationship between 
participation in CFA and household land area under trees. It also examined the factors 
that drive households to participate in CFAs. 
 
Empirical results indicate that CFA member households have 0.428 more acres of land 
under tree cultivation than the non-members. The implication of this is that decentralized 
forest management is a viable approach towards increasing forest cover in the country. 
To ensure that households effectively participate in the community forest associations, 
policy makers must device alternative livelihood and income-generation mechanisms to 
ease financial constraints among the forest-adjacent communities. Alternatively, funding 
mechanisms for the CFA operations may need to be devised so that it is less burdensome 
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particularly to the poor participating and/or intending-to-participate segments of the 
society. 
 
Campaigns for participation in CFA by households should target educating the 
households on the relevant components of the Forest Act (2005) because those who 
understand the Act have a higher probability of joining CFAs. Moreover, the campaigns 
should motivate communities to form other social groups as well because those who 
participate in other social groups are more likely to later join the CFAs. More 
importantly, forest management agencies should guarantee entry into forests for 
extraction of specified forest products because restrictive entry discourages households 
from joining CFA and participating in the devolved forest management arrangements. 
 
In a nutshell, promising policies include: 
a) Increasing access to information, especially with regards to the content of 
the Forest Act (2005); 
b) Increasing access to formal credit among the forest communities; 
c) Promoting formation of social groups, other than CFAs, among the forest 
communities; 
d) Improving infrastructure to link communities with the forests so as to 
minimize transport cost that individuals incur on harvesting forest 
products; and 
e) Providing increased access to forests by the adjacent communities. 
Possibly, the range of products harvested and other activities allowed in 
the forest could be expanded to cater for the varying interests of 
households. This would make participation in CFAs more rewarding to 
households. 
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